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One of the most important factors determin-
ing a firm’s profitable growth is scientific 
and technological progress. Innovations are 
vitally important for companies to compete 
with one another. Global statistics shows 
that a huge amount of investments are fo-
cused on research and development projects 
in different sectors of the economy such 
as software and programming, biotechno-
logical products, capital goods, beverages, 
Российский журнал менеджмента
16 (1): 37–62 (2018)
Russian Management Journal
16 (1): 37–62 (2018)
38 E. Y. Makeeva, M. O. Khugaeva
RMJ 16 (1): 37–62 (2018)
accessories, restaurants, retail, hotels and 
motels, and so on.
However, R&D investments are charac-
terized by high uncertainty, so not every 
company can afford such risky investments. 
Most small and medium enterprises (SMEs) 
are examples of the latter type. Besides ex-
ternal uncontrollable factors such as crises, 
disasters, political instability, and armed 
conflicts, each firm has its own internal 
problems. Taken together this can lead to 
financial distress or even failure of a firm, 
and each additional risky asset can increase 
the probability of insolvency.
Thus, the relevance of the present paper 
is that each company has to find the optimal 
tradeoff between investments in innovations 
and risk of financial distress. The solution 
to this problem can improve a company’s 
efficiency and lead to its growth. And vice 
versa, an unsuccessful selection can result 
even in the failure of a firm.
The purpose of the present paper is to 
evaluate financial distress costs of innovative 
companies. The subject of the investigation 
is financial distress costs. Our study focuses 
on companies that spent at least $200 mil-
lion on research and development in 2015. 
Data are collected from Bloomberg and the 
financial reports of companies. The novelty 
of the present paper is in suggested model 
for direct and indirect cost evaluation of 
innovative companies.
literature review
Academic papers define financial distress 
as the condition experienced by a company 
that cannot pay its obligations to finance its 
debt. Analysts differentiate it from bank-
ruptcy, explaining this by the fact that 
bankruptcy is one of the outcomes of insol-
vency. However, the latest financial crisis 
showed that a corporation can go bankrupt 
very unexpectedly. That is why it is neces-
sary to be on the lookout even for “healthy” 
companies and observe their financial dis-
tress costs in order to take action before 
their failure.
Empirical studies outline two types of 
financial distress costs: direct and indirect. 
Direct costs include different administra-
tive costs connected with the bankruptcy, 
reorganization, liquidation process, or other 
bankruptcy costs. Indirect costs are defined 
as alternative costs or missed opportunities.
The paper [Warner, 1977] was one of the 
first papers devoted to financial distress 
costs evaluation. The author examines direct 
costs at 11 railroad companies in the US 
in 1933–1955 using the following method. 
He takes expenditures connected with the 
bankruptcy process and divides this figure by 
the amount of a firm’s total market value. 
However, the important assumption was 
that a company’s value is equal to equity 
and debt issued in the seven years preced-
ing the bankruptcy. The results of Warner’s 
research showed that direct financial costs 
are equal to 1.0–5.3% of firm’s value on 
average (depending on the chosen base year). 
Therefore, it was concluded that these costs 
do not influence financial decisions as they 
are much smaller than tax benefits.
The studies followed after [Warner, 1977] 
did not yield significant results for capital 
structure decisions. The question arises: if 
distress costs are not important, then why 
do firms not use debt financing alone? Thus 
the experts decided to find the indirect costs 
of financial distress. The first expert who 
tried to calculate them was E. Altman. In 
[Altman, 1984] he tried to find the optimal 
capital structure by comparing bankruptcy 
costs with the benefits provided by financial 
leverage and, in the case when the present 
value of insolvency is higher than tax gains, 
the company has to decrease its debt to eq-
uity ratio. The results of Altman’s analy-
sis show that bankruptcy costs matter: in 
the three years preceding bankruptcy, total 
bankruptcy costs were equal to 12.4–16.7% 
of the firm’s value on average. Also, the au-
thor finds that present value of bankruptcy 
costs is higher than the present value of 
tax benefits at most of studied firms and, 
consequently, the firms’ debt level is much 
higher than their optimal one.
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The paper [Thorburn, 2000] examined 
263 Swedish bankrupt firms. The author 
estimates direct bankruptcy costs (such as 
lawyer, consulting, & administrative costs) 
and finds that these costs represent 6.4% 
of pre-filing assets on average, and 19.1% 
for bankruptcy auctions. The results are 
significant, although the author only ex-
amines the direct costs of financial dis-
tress. Another view on distress costs was 
put forward by [Opler, Titman, 1994]. They 
tried to analyze the link between insolvency 
and corporate performance in distressed 
industries rather than individual distressed 
companies. The authors compared whether 
highly leveraged companies lose more oper-
ating profit than more conservative ones. 
Unfortunately, Opler and Titman did not 
evaluate the costs of financial distress, but 
they did come to the conclusion that con-
nection between debt ratio and performance 
is stronger for companies with huge R&D 
investments and in the case of more con-
centrated industries.
The idea of financial distress costs anal-
ysis, without any reference to economic 
costs, was developed in the paper [Andrade, 
Kaplan, 1998]. They analyze 31 financially 
distressed, highly leveraged transactions 
(HLT) and find that the net costs of financial 
distress amount about 10–20% of firm’s 
value. These results explain why firms be-
have themselves quite conservatively.
Although the aforementioned papers are 
rather old, there are many studies that use 
the methodologies proposed there. For exam-
ple, the indirect costs calculation approach 
of Altman was recently repeated by [Kwansa, 
Cho, 1995; Pham, Chow, 1989; Bhabra, Yao, 
2011; Bulot, Salamudin, Abdoh, 2014] and 
others.
In [Kwansa, Cho, 1995] authors covered 
bankrupt restaurant firms’ indirect costs 
and found that they should be taken into 
account when making financial decisions 
(on average, 7% of firm’s value). In their 
turn, Pham & Chow (1989) analyzed bank-
rupt Australian companies in 1978–1983. 
The authors came to the conclusion that 
total financial distress costs were equal to 
15.9–22.4% of a company’s value. This fact 
also supports the hypothesis that distress 
costs matter. Later, in [Bhabra, Yao, 2011], 
the US bankrupt firms in 1997–2004 were 
examined. It was found that the costs of 
financial distress divided by a company’s 
value amounted 6.09%, 9.71% and 17.43% 
relative to the year prior to bankruptcy. For 
the developing markets [Wijantini, 2007] 
covered Indonesian financially distressed 
companies in the period from 1997 to 2002. 
The found mean value of indirect costs was 
equal to 3–11% of total sales. Recently, 
[Bu lot, Salamudin, Abdoh, 2014] tried to es-
timate indirect costs of financial distress in 
the trading and services sector in Malaysia. 
The analysis finds that indirect costs are sig-
nificant and amounted 3.1–21.39% of firms’ 
value. Malaysian firms were also examined in 
[Bulot, Salamudin, Aziz, 2017]. The analysis 
of 190 financially distressed companies in 
2001–2011 revealed that indirect distress 
costs are equal to 21.6% on average.
Another method of measuring indirect 
costs of financial distress was used in [Hor-
taçsu et al., 2013]. The authors analyze all 
public automobile companies in the period 
between 1985 and 2010. They examine in-
direct financial costs using credit default 
swap spreads and find that marginal indirect 
costs are equal to 2–39% of firm’s value. 
The researchers paid attention to Ford and 
General Motors, and compared their distress 
costs to tax benefits. The analysis showed 
that indirect costs in some years exceeded 
tax benefits.
Many papers devoted to direct financial 
costs are based on another Altman study, 
the Z-score model. The article was written 
in 1968, but it remains very popular still. 
The aim of the paper was to develop a model 
that can predict a firm’s bankruptcy with 
the help of financial and economic ratios 
[Altman, 1968].
The other method for calculating direct 
costs was used in [Mansi, Maxwell, Zhang, 
2012]. Their study covers 120 608 monthly 
observations on 1752 companies during the 
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period from 1980 to 2006. The researchers 
made an effort to determine bankruptcy 
probability according to firms’ bond ratings. 
The results showed average figures for AA, 
A, BBB, BB and B rated companies being 
equal to 0.206, 0.255, 0.353, 0.433 and 
0.535, respectively.
In [Zhang, 2015] the author also uses 
Z-score. He examines whether there is any 
connection between R&D investments and 
a company’s distress risk measured by Alt-
man’s Z-score. The results show a positive 
relationship, which is especially high dur-
ing economic downturns [Zhang, 2015]. The 
author introduces and estimates four models 
with four R&D indicators: R&D expenses 
scaled by total assets, sales, number of em-
ployees, and R&D capital divided by total 
assets. The present paper refers to Zhang’s 
R&D index evaluation for further investiga-
tion of distress risk costs in the innovative 
sector.
Findings of all covered studies are briefly 
described in Table 1.
In order to estimate direct and indirect 
costs, analysts used different methodologies. 
Altman in his paper of 1968 estimated direct 
financial distress costs through bankruptcy. 
He used multiple discriminant analysis to 
determine variables that influence the like-
lihood of insolvency. This investigation has 
disadvantages: it involves a firm’s charac-
teristics, but does not consider country-
specific indicators. That is why it should 
not be used for developing countries. Be-
sides, it is not very good for studying long-
term forecasts.
After Altman’s paper, multiple discrim-
inant analysis became very popular for bank-
ruptcy prediction. Many modifications of 
the Z-score equation were developed with 
different independent variables; their num-
ber amounted to 2–47. However, multiple 
discriminant analysis has a huge drawback: 
there is no opportunity to predict the prob-
ability of bankruptcy for firms that are in 
the “grey area”.
Another method was suggested in [Ohlson, 
1980]. He tried to estimate bankruptcy prob-
ability through a logistic regression model. 
The sample consisted of 105 bankrupt com-
panies and 2058 non-bankrupt firms during 
the period between 1970 and 1976. Ohlson 
tested nine variables and only four of the 
characteristics showed significant results: 
size, financial structure, performance, and 
current liability.
There are many papers that based their 
research on Ohlson’s methodology. One of 
them is [Ho et al., 2013]. The authors ana-
lyzed 122 North American public companies 
in the period from 1990 to 2009. The sam-
ple includes 12 bankrupt firms. Two models 
were proposed. The first one includes nine 
variables according to Ohlson’s methodology 
and the second one includes nine factors, 
and also real GDP growth and the real inter-
est rate of two-year Treasury bonds as mac-
roeconomic proxies. As expected, the ex-
tended model predicts bankruptcy better 
than the original.
Recent papers also show a preference 
for binary choice models, and the results 
give a very high level of prediction. For 
example, [Jones, Hensher, 2004] analyzed 
3032 firm-year observations in the period 
between 1996 and 2000. The authors used 
a mixed logit model and came to the con-
clusion that the model has a forecasting 
accuracy of 99.16% on the pooled data. In 
[Laitinen, Suvas, 2016] authors gathered 
a large sample of 1 255 768 non-bankrupt 
and 22 594 bankrupt firm-year observa-
tions from 26 countries during 2007–2010. 
The authors examined the influence of Hof-
stede’s cultural characteristics on financial 
distress prediction and found that some 
of them demonstrate a significant impact.
Russian researchers also prefer to use 
this methodology. In [Zhdanov, Afanasyeva, 
2011] the aviation industry was examin-
ed. The authors analyze 20 non-bankrupt 
and 20 bankrupt companies in 2001–2010. 
Forty variables are divided into four catego-
ries: profitability, financial sustainability, 
business activity, and liquidity. The re-
sults show that the model accuracy for the 
Russian aviation industry amounts 75%.
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Table 1
summary of financial distress costs’ studies
author Data period results
Direct costs
Warner (1977) 11 US railroad firms 1933–1955 1.0–5.3% of firm’s value on average
Altman (1984) 18 US firms: 11 retail-
ers, 7 other industrial 
firms
1974–1978 8.1–10.5% of firm’s value
Pham, Chow 
(1989)
55 Australian firms September 
1978–May 
1983
On average 2.5% and 3.6% of firm value at 
the year before bankruptcy and in the year 
when bankruptcy occurred
Weiss (1990) 37 US firms November 
1979–De cem-
ber 1986
On average from 1% to 6.6% of market capi-
talization of shares
Andrade, Kaplan 
(1998)
31 financially distressed 
firms with highly lever-
aged transactions
1980–1989 10–20% of firm’s value
Thorburn (2000) 263 Swedish firms 1988–1991 6.4% of pre-filing assets on average, and 
19.1% for bankruptcy auctions
LoPucki, 
Doherty (2004)
48 US firms 1998–2002 1.4% of firm’s assets
Bris, Welch, 
Zhu (2006)
286 firms in Arizona 
and New York
1995–2001 8.1% of firm’s pre-bankruptcy assets on 
average after liquidation; 1.6% of firm’s 
pre-bankruptcy assets on average after reor-
ganization 
Mansi, Maxwell, 
Zhang (2012)
1752 companies 1980–2006 Bankruptcy probability for AA, A, BBB, 
BB, and B bonds on average is 0.206, 0.255, 
0.353, 0.433, and 0.535, respectively
Charalambakis, 
Garrett (2016)
UK and Indian compa-
nies
1980–2011 Expected default frequency for UK market is 
equal to 1%, and for Indian firms — 2%
Indirect costs
Altman (1984) 18 US firms: 11 retail-
ers, 7 other industrial 
firms
1974–1978 4.3–6.2% of firm’s value
Pham, Chow 
(1989)
55 Australian firms September 
1978–May 
1983
On average 13.4% and 18.7% of firm value 
at the year before bankruptcy and in the 
year when bankruptcy occurred
Kwansa, Cho 
(1995)
US restaurant firms 1980–1992 7% of firm’s value on average
Wijantini (2007) 28 Indonesian firms 1997–2002 3–11% of total sales on average
Bhabra, Yao 
(2011)
62 bankrupt firms in 
USA 
1997–2004 2%, 6.2% and 14.9% of firm value in the 
year prior to bankruptcy
Hortaçsu et al. 
(2013)
Automobile manufac-
turers in the US
1985–2010 2–39% of firm’s value
Bulot, 
Salamudin, 
Abdoh (2014)
48 Malaysian listed 
companies from trad-
ing and services sector
15 February 
2001–31 De -
cember 2011
3.1–21.39% of firms’ value
Bulot et al. (2017) 190 Malaysian firms 2001–2011 21.6% of total sales on average
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Another interesting paper is [Fedorova, 
Gilenko, Dovzhenko, 2013], which studied 
the Russian manufacturing industry. The 
sample involves 3001 non-bankrupt and 
504 bankrupt firms during the period from 
2007 to 2011. Both logit-regression method 
and probit approach were used. However, 
the results show that the logit approach is 
better suited. The accuracy of the model 
was estimated using two methods and dem-
onstrated a predictive accuracy of 87.14% 
and 84.7%, which proves the high predictive 
power of the model.
Many research studies devoted to bank-
ruptcy probability prediction suggested an-
other methodology, i. e., the neural networks 
approach. This approach has advantages over 
the others since it does not take non-nor-
mality or correlation between variables into 
account; it does not have the same limita-
tions possessed by a multiple discriminant 
analysis or binary model when a sample is 
incomplete or not clearly defined. That is 
why some authors think that this technique 
can predict bankruptcy better then statisti-
cal methodology. However, previous research 
does not always prove it. For example, [Chen 
et al., 2006] examined 940 non-bankrupt and 
89 bankrupt Chinese firms between 1990 
and 2003. The authors used four models 
to predict bankruptcy: linear discriminant 
analysis, logistic regression, decision trees, 
and a neural network. In order to find which 
model works best, the authors estimated the 
total costs of misclassification, and the lo-
gistic regression and neural networks yielded 
the poorest results.
The paper [Makeeva, Bakurova, 2012] 
presents the prediction of bankruptcy at 
European oil & gas companies in the period 
from 2000 to 2010. The authors used two 
approaches: logistic regression and neural 
network. They came to the conclusion that 
logistic regression does not work as well as 
neural networks since the accuracy of mod-
els is equal to 76% and 98%, respectively. 
Although the second method predicts bet-
ter, [Makeeva, Bakurova, 2012] emphasized 
that using this technique greatly depends 
on the chosen sample, which can lead to 
biased results.
Unfortunately, there is no perfect meth-
od that suits every research study. So, in 
order to put together the pros and cons 
of the most popular approaches we place 
Table 2.
Empirical studies do not have many tech-
niques for evaluating indirect financial costs. 
Probably the oldest approach was suggested 
in [Altman, 1984]. He estimated indirect 
costs as the profit losses/gains relative to 
industrial figures. It is important to mention 
that this method was used by most research-
ers who tried to evaluate indirect distress 
costs to present. That is why the methodol-
ogy of the present paper will follow it, too. 
A detailed, step-by step explanation will be 
provided later.
Table 2
advantages and disadvantages of different methods for evaluating the probability of bankruptcy
method advantages Disadvantages
Multiple 
Discriminant 
Analysis
Simple calculation.
Use of several accounting indicators simultane-
ously
Assumptions of normality.
“Grey zone”.
Complicated interpretation of results
Binary 
Model
High level of accuracy.
Simple calculation.
Ability to take into account industry specific 
factors
Does not work well with a large number 
of categorical variables.
Multicollinearity can lead to overestima-
tion of results
Neural 
Networks
Does not take non-normality or correlation 
between variables into account.
Works with incomplete samples or those that 
are not clearly defined
Sophisticated methodology/code writing.
Too sensitive for chosen sample.
Complicated interpretation of results
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Hypotheses
Against this presented background of theo-
retical and empirical studies we can formu-
late the set of hypotheses.
Performance characteristics of a firm. The 
nine financial explanatory variables are taken 
from Ohlson’s paper. The authors decided to 
forecast their influence on the probability of 
bankruptcy in accordance with the original 
paper [Ohlson, 1980]. Leverage is estimated 
as the total debt to market capitalization. 
The higher the debt, the higher are the in-
terest expenses that negatively influence the 
interest coverage ratio. Dependent variable 
is a dummy variable equal to 1 if interest 
coverage is less than 1 and 0 otherwise. The 
influence of current liabilities to current 
assets and cash flow from operating activity 
to total debt has the same logic, so sign of 
these variables should be positive and nega-
tive, respectively. Working capital scaled by 
total assets is expected to be negative, as the 
numerator of the ratio is estimated as cur-
rent assets minus current liabilities. Thus, 
the higher the working capital, the lower 
are the interest expenses, and the higher is 
the interest coverage ratio, so the dummy 
is not equal to 1.
Variables that include net income have an 
impact on earnings before interest, taxes, 
depreciation and amortization (EBITDA), 
which is the numerator of the interest cov-
erage ratio. Therefore, the return on assets 
and changes in net income have a positive 
effect on the interest coverage ratio, but a 
negative impact on the dependent dummy. 
The dummy for net income, if it was nega-
tive over the last two years is equal to 1, 
and 0 otherwise. It should have a positive 
impact as if it is equal to 1, then interest 
coverage is lower than 0, and the dependent 
dummy is equal to 1. The size of company 
is presented by a natural logarithm of total 
assets. Logically, the larger the company is, 
the lower is the likelihood of bankruptcy.
The dummy for the total debt to total 
assets ratio is included in the equation as 
a correction for the companies with a nega-
tive equity value. Ohlson suggests that the 
coefficient may have different signs, so its 
influence is indeterminate.
It was suggested that direct financial 
costs are estimated as the probability of 
bankruptcy multiplied by sales, which means 
that the probability of bankruptcy has di-
rect impact on these costs. So, if the listed 
factors are significant in the likelihood of 
bankruptcy, they play the same role in an 
evaluation of direct financial costs. Thus, 
the following hypotheses are posited:
Hypothesis 1. Leverage has positive in-
fluence on the probability of bankruptcy.
Hypothesis 2. The current liabilities to 
current assets ratio has a positive influence 
on bankruptcy probability.
Hypothesis 3. The dummy for net income 
has a positive impact on the probability of 
bankruptcy.
Hypothesis 4. The size of a company 
negatively influences the likelihood of bank-
ruptcy.
Hypothesis 5. Working capital scaled by 
total assets has negative influence on bank-
ruptcy probability.
Hypothesis 6. Return on assets has nega-
tive impact on the probability of bankruptcy.
Hypothesis 7. Cash flow from operating 
activity to total debt has a negative influ-
ence on bankruptcy probability.
Hypothesis 8. Net income growth has 
negative impact on the probability of bank-
ruptcy.
Market characteristics of a firm. Here 
book to market value of total assets and stock 
return volatility are analyzed. According to 
[Zhang, 2015], they have a positive impact 
upon the probability of distress.
Hypothesis 9. The higher the book to mar-
ket value of total assets, the higher are the 
direct financial distress costs.
Hypothesis 10. The higher the stock re-
turn volatility, the higher are the direct 
financial distress costs.
Research & development characteristics 
of a firm. R&D expenses are very risky in-
vestments because of the uncertainty since 
only a portion of R&D investments lead to 
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successful outcomes. That is why previous 
empirical papers have found a positive rela-
tionship between R&D expenses and financial 
distress.
Hypothesis 11. The higher the R&D ex-
penses, the higher are the direct financial 
distress costs.
Data
Sample
To evaluate financial distress costs of in-
novative companies, a sample comprised of 
389 firms spending more than $200 million 
a year on research and development in 2015 
was gathered. Information about companies 
and industries was collected for the period 
from 2006 to 2015. Most data were taken 
from Bloomberg; the rest of indicators were 
taken from the annual reports of the com-
panies themselves.
The sample presents firms from 25 coun-
tries: 37% of the most innovative companies 
are from the US, 19% from Japan, and 10% 
from China. The rest of the corporations 
are from Germany, South Korea, Switzer-
land, Japan, Great Britain, France, Finland, 
the Netherlands, Sweden, Ireland, Taiwan, 
Den mark, Italy, Israel, Belgium, Spain, Ber-
muda, Australia, Saudi Arabia Brazil, Rus-
sia, Canada, and India. The firms from both 
developed and emerging economies are re-
presented in the sample. The data is in mil-
lions of US dollars, except stock price return 
and stock price volatility.
The sample was compiled subject to the 
following limitation: a company’s R&D ex-
penses should have been more than $200 mil-
lion in 2015. So the data includes 389 in-
novative firms from nine industries: com-
munications; consumer, cyclical; technology; 
consumer, non-cyclical; industrial; financial; 
energy; basic materials; and utilities. Most 
of chosen companies operate in the industrial 
sector, 88 holdings. A huge number of firms 
are from technological and consumer non-
cyclical industries, 20% and 21%, respec-
tively. Another 17% of corporations from 
the sample are companies from the consumer 
cyclical sector. The rest of the firms form 
about 20% of the total.
It is important to mention that some 
companies from the sample appeared not 
so long ago, i. e., some of the firms are less 
than 10 years old, which is why the sample 
is unbalanced.
Variables description
For further investigation, it is necessary 
to choose variables that can influence both 
direct and indirect costs of financial dis-
tress. Direct costs are equal to bankruptcy 
probability costs, and indirect costs are un-
expected losses/profits.
Ohlson’s model was chosen as the basis 
for the methodology of the first part of the 
present paper. The difference between the 
present research and Ohlson’s paper is that 
the first includes only non-bankrupt firms 
while the second combines both bankrupt 
and non-bankrupt companies. That is why 
the interest coverage ratio was chosen as 
an indicator of financial distress. It is cal-
culated according to the following formula:
Interest covarage ratio
Earnings before interest taxes
deprec
=
=
, ,
iation and amortization
Interest expenses
.
 (1)
Thus, dependent dummy variable y is 
equal to 1 if the interest coverage ratio is 
lower than 1 and 0 otherwise.
Financial independent variables were tak-
en from Ohlson’s paper. A more detailed 
explanation is given below in Table 3.
The first factor is the Size. It is added 
in order to take into account the effect of 
scale. The indicators that describe financial 
stability are financial Leverage, dummy vari-
ables that show whether debt exceeds total 
assets or not, and Cash flows provided by 
operations divided by total liabilities. The 
Dummy for leverage “serves as a discontinu-
ity correction for financial leverage” [Ohlson, 
1980]. Ohlson calculated leverage according 
to the total debt-to-total assets ratio, but 
this factor yielded insignificant results. So, 
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we decided to use the debt-to-market capi-
talization ratio in this study. Liquidity is 
presented by the Current ratio. Profitability 
ratios are represented by the Return on as­
sets and Working capital scaled by total as­
sets. Besides the listed factors, Ohlson ex-
amined the following two factors, which are 
also taken into account in the present inves-
tigation, i. e., Net income growth and the 
Dummy for net income and whether it was 
negative over the previous two years.
In addition to the chosen financial factors, 
it was decided to examine variables accord-
ing to [Zhang, 2015], which included more 
firm characteristics and market indicators, 
stock return volatility and the book-to-mar-
ket value of total assets, measured as:
BV of total assets
BV of totalassets
BV of equity Marketvalue of eq
−
− + uity( )
. (2)
This paper is devoted to an examination 
of the innovative firms, and we decided to 
add industry-specific characteristics and 
R&D investment ratios. Zhang suggested 
four R&D characteristics, i. e., R&D expen­
ditures to total assets, to sales, and to the 
number of employees. The last indicator is 
R&D capital to total assets [Zhang, 2015, 
p. 98]. It is calculated as:
RDC RD RD
RD RD RD
i t i t i t
i t i t i
, , ,
, , ,
.
. . .
= + ⋅ +
+ ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅
−
− −
0 8
0 6 0 4 0 2
1
2 3 t−4.
 (3)
These four factors are described in Table 4.
Thus, the analysis includes 15 indepen-
dent variables: financial and non-financial 
firm characteristics as well as market and 
industry factors.
methodology
Most papers devoted to evaluation of finan-
cial distress costs use panel data in order 
to obtain more accurate coefficients and 
clearer predictions. Today there are many 
proposed methodologies, but none can yield 
Table 3
independent financial variables
variable label measure
Size Size ln (Total  assets)
Leverage Leverage Total debt
Market capitalization of shares
Dummy for leverage Ldummy, 
L
1
0
if Total debt exceeds Total assets
if otherwise
,



Operating cash flow scaled by total debt Ocftl Operating cash flow
Total debt
Current ratio Clca Current liabilities
Current assets
Return on assets ROA Net income
Total assets
Working capital scaled by total assets Wcta Working capital
Total assets
Net income growth Nigrowth NI NI
NI NI
t t
t t
−
+
−
−
1
1
Dummy for net income Nn 1
0
if Net income was negative last two years
if otherwise
,



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perfect results that contain each country, 
industry or even firm. The most widespread 
approaches include multiple discriminant 
analysis, binary regressions, and neural net-
works. After comparing the pros and cons 
of each method, we decided to opt for the 
binary choice model in this investigation, 
in particular, a logit regression. Ohlson’s 
model modification will serve as the basis 
for an evaluation of direct financial dis-
tress costs, given that it seems necessary 
to include macroeconomic and market vari-
ables in the analysis, as [Zhang, 2015] did. 
Indirect financial distress costs will be es-
timated as profit losses/gains according to 
Altman’s analysis.
Methodology of the evaluation of direct 
financial costs
One of the assumptions of the present paper 
is that direct distress financial costs are 
equal to bankruptcy costs, as there is no 
common opinion on this term.
A huge amount of previous empirical 
studies have tried to find out which model 
predicts bankruptcy better than others, but 
they did not reach a common conclusion. 
In 2006, Aziz and Dar came to the conclu-
sion that the most popular methods for 
calculating direct financial distress costs 
are statistical methods, i. e. multiple dis-
criminant analysis and binary choice mod-
els are the most frequently used. However, 
multiple discriminant analysis has a sig-
nificant disadvantage — the existence of a 
“grey zone” where the probability of bank-
ruptcy cannot be predicted. This is why the 
binary choice model, the logistic regression, 
was selected as the basis for this part of 
the analysis.
Variable yi, t is the dependent variable 
of firm i in year t. It takes the value 1 if 
the interest coverage ratio is lower than 1 
and 0 if otherwise. xi, t are the independent 
variables. The function of the probability 
that yi, t takes a value of 1 is described by 
the formula (4):
P y x xi t i t i i i t, , ,| , ,=  = + ′( )1 β α α βΛ , (4)
where Λ α βi i tx+ ′( ),  is the logistic cumula-
tive distribution function with Λ y e
e
y
y( ) = +1  
[Cameron, 2005, p. 795]. Here yi, t can be 
found as a function from the independent 
variables (5):
y xi t i t, ,= ′β . (5)
The joint density function of company i is
f y X F x
F x
i i i
t
T
i i t
y
i i t
y
i t| , , ,
,
,β α α β
α β
( ) = + ′ ⋅( ) ×
× − + ′ ⋅( )( )
=
−
∏
1
1
1 i t, .
 (6)
Furthermore, the analysis is based on 
panel data that gives an opportunity for 
using the extended version of the logit re-
gression, i. e., the panel logit regression, 
Table 4
r&D indicators
variable label measure
R&D expenditures scaled by total assets Rda R D expenditures
Total assets
&
R&D expenditures scaled by sales Rds R D expenditures
Sales
&
R&D expenditures scaled by number of employees Rde R D expenditures
Number of employees
&
R&D capital scaled by total assets Rdcta R D capital
Total assets
&
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which can be estimated through fixed effect 
and random effect models.
The random effect binary model assumes 
that the firm-specific effect is a random vari-
able and that it is uncorrelated with the in-
dependent variables. This approach supposes 
that individual effects submit to a normal 
distribution ε σi t eN, , 0 2( ), α σαi t N, , 0 2( ) and 
that the joint density function is given in 
the following formula:
f y X
y X e d
i i
i i i i
i
| , ,
| , , .
β σ
β α
piσ
α
α
α
α
σα
2
2
21
2
2
2
( ) =
= ( )
−
∫
 (7)
The fixed effect model assumes that firm-
specific effect is a random factor, but in 
contrast to random effect model, it can be 
correlated with independent factors. The 
joint density for firm i of this model is
f y X e e
e
i i i
y y x
t
x
i t i t t i t i t
i i t
| , ,
, , ,
,
β α
α β
α β( ) =
∑
⋅
∑
+
⋅ ′( )⋅
+ ′ ⋅∏ 1  . (8)
Thus, the functions for the dependent 
variable look as follows
1) y x ui t i t i i t, , ,= + ⋅ + +( )α β ϑ  for the random 
effect model;
2) y u xi t i i t i t, , ,= +( ) + ⋅ +α β ϑ  for the fixed ef-
fect model.
In our case, the dependent variable is 
described by 12 independent factors:
y Size Leverage
L Ocftd
i t i i t i t
i t i t
, , ,
, ,
= + ⋅ + ⋅ +
+ ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅
α β β
β β β
1 2
3 4 5 Clca
ROA Wcta Nigrowth
Nn
i t
i t i t i t
i t
,
, , ,
,
+
+ ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ +
+ ⋅ +
β β β
β β
6 7 8
9 10 11
12
⋅ + ⋅ +
+ ⋅ +
Bm Vol
R D indicator
i t i t
i t i t
, ,
, ,& .
β
β ε
 (9)
The logic is that the original Ohlson model 
will be regressed, and after that, market and 
industry factors will be added one by one. 
Special attention should be paid to indus-
try variables, i. e., four R&D expenditures 
indicators are included, but the four models 
will be evaluated with each factor separately. 
After constructing the models, the one with 
the most predictive power will be chosen.
It should be mentioned that
1) the probability of financial distress rises 
with y;
2) y P
P
=
−( )log 1 .
As Ohlson remarks, these relations make 
the model easy to interpret [Ohlson, 1980, 
p. 118].
The quality of the models will be esti-
mated through the area under the receiver 
operating characteristic (ROC) curve. If it 
is more than 70%, then such a model has 
a high level of predictive power. So, the 
models will be compared according to this 
criterion.
In order to evaluate the direct financial 
distress costs the following assumption was 
taken: the derived probability should be 
multiplied by the sales of each firm-year 
observation. The logic here is that if the 
bankruptcy happens, then sales will be equal 
to zero with the probability:
DDC
Probability of bancruptcy Sales
i t
i t
,
, .
=
= ′⋅
 (10)
Methodology for the evaluation of indirect 
financial costs
The next step of the methodology is evalu-
ation of indirect financial costs. Previous 
empirical research does not give such a wide 
range of choices as in the case of direct 
costs. Intuitively the indirect costs of fi-
nancial distress reflect unexpected profit or 
losses. The first paper where it was esti-
mated was [Altman, 1984]. Nevertheless, 
it is a relatively old approach that is still 
popular among analysts.
For a better understanding, a more de-
tailed explanation is given below step by 
step. The sales of the firm were regressed on 
total industry sales for the 10 prior years:
S S t yearsi t I t, , ,= + ⋅ =α β 10 , (11)
where Si t,  — sales of firm i in period t; SI t,  — 
aggregate sales of industry I in period t.
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In this case, the sales of firm i at the mo-
ment t are the firm’s sales in 2015. Industry 
sales over previous 10 years are the sales of 
the global industry in 2005–2014.
After that, Altman included aggregate 
industry sales and obtained estimated com-
pany sales:
^
, ,S Si t I t= + ⋅α β . (12)
Then the author suggests calculating aver-
age profit margin for sales over the 10 years 
prior to the period under consideration. 
After that, if we multiply estimated sales 
of the firm by sales margin, we will obtain 
estimated profit:
^
, ,P S PMi t i t= ⋅ . (13)
In order to find the indirect costs, we 
have to compare real profit with estimated 
profit, i. e., the difference between them is 
equal to indirect distress costs [Altman, 
1984, p. 1073]:
IDC P P Pi t i t i t= = −∆ , , , . (14)
Thus, for each firm we calculate indi-
rect and direct costs of financial distress 
for 2015. The total value of distress costs 
is equal to the sum of these two values:
TDC DDC IDC= + . (15)
results
Descriptive statistics
Before moving to our calculations, it is nec-
essary to describe the collected data and 
check variables for multicollinearity.
The initial number of observation is equal 
to 3729 for 389 companies, so the sample is 
unbalanced. There are firms in the sample 
that were founded between 2006 and 2015, 
and they have fewer observations present in 
the sample. The calculation of net income 
growth also limits the number of observa-
tions as they are computed with indicators 
from previous years.
Unfortunately, there are many outliers. 
In order to get unbiased results they were 
dropped from the sample. Final descriptive 
statistics of the data is given in Table 5.
Table 5 contains information about mean 
value, standard deviation, minimum and maxi-
mum values of the variables. The overall num-
ber of observations is equal to 3714 and 3326 
for net income growth. There is huge interval 
between minimum and maximum value for 
the factors. It can be explained by the 10-year 
period of analysis that includes not only the 
global financial crisis of 2007, separate re-
cessions in different countries, but also the 
specific features of the innovative companies 
since such firms invest a lot in R&D projects. 
Special attention should be paid to the 
dependent variable y. It has a mean value 
of 0.051 with a standard deviation equal to 
0.22. For a better understanding of what 
happens to the sample, the Table 6 was con-
structed in Stata 13.0.
It can be concluded that if a firm was 
not in distress in the previous year, it will 
be distressed this year with the probability 
2.02%, and with a 97.98% chance that it 
will become healthy. At the same time, the 
probability that a company will be distressed 
this year if it was distressed last year is 
62.2%, with a 37.8% chance that it will 
become healthy.
The variables were also checked for mul-
ticollinearity, and a VIF was constructed for 
this purpose. It is lower than 5, so it can be 
concluded that there is no multicollinearity 
between the factors (see Appendix).
The second part of the research performs 
a calculation of unexpected profit or losses 
as it was suggested by Altman. The follow-
ing variables are included: a firm’s sales 
for 2015, the aggregate industry sales for 
2005–2014, the average profit margin in 
2006–2015 for each company, and net in-
come in 2015. All factors are in absolute 
terms, except for average profit margin, 
which is calculated as the sum of net in-
come scaled by sales during the 10 years 
and divided by 10. Descriptive statistics is 
presented in Table 7.
^
^
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Companies’ sales and net income have 
very high standard deviation, but the es-
timation of indirect distress costs is con-
ducted for each firm separately, so there is 
no need to drop outliers. As stated above, 
the firms from the sample operate in nine 
industries. Sectors’ aggregate sales for the 
10 years prior to 2015 range from $21.6 tril-
lion to $76.1 trillion. It is notable that the 
net income was negative at 42 companies in 
2015, even in such giants as Volkswagen, 
General Electric, Tesla, Yahoo! and so on. 
This explains why the minimum average 
profit margin is negative.
Evaluation of direct distress costs
Estimation of direct financial distress costs 
is based on panel data analysis. Overall pan-
el data has advantages over the other types 
of data as it gives an opportunity to take 
Table 5
Descriptive statistics for direct distress costs model
variable observations mean std. Dev. min max
y 3714 0.05 0.22 0 1
Size 3714 9.67 1.32 7.17 12.02
Leverage 3714 0.44 1.07 0 27.98
Ldummy 3714 0.11 0.31 0 1
Wcta 3714 0.18 0.16 –0.07 0.54
Clca 3714 0.65 0.28 0.2 1.23
ROA 3714 0.06 0.06 –0.06 0.17
Ocftl 3714 1.86 4.18 –0.01 18.25
Nn 3714 0.05 0.21 0 1
Nigrowth 3326 0.02 0.44 –1 1
Vol 3714 0.36 0.13 0 0.65
Bm 3714 0.66 0.27 0.21 1.11
Rda 3714 0.06 0.05 0 0.19
Rds 3714 0.09 0.08 0 0.31
Rde 3714 0.04 0.04 0 0.16
Rdcta 3714 0.12 0.13 0 0.45
Table 6
Dependent variable description
y 0 1 total
0 97.98  2.02 100
1 37.8 62.2 100
total 95.01  4.99 100
Table 7
Descriptive statistics for indirect distress costs model
variable N mean std. Dev. min max
Sales 389 30 493.49 45 317.72 41.1 283 934.3
Industry 389 49 192.7 19 413.8 21 609.2 76 061.6
Averagepm 389 0.09 0.12 –0.62 0.69
Ni 389 2032.97 4407.57 –13 494.52 53 394
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into account individual differences of enti-
ties during various periods of time.
There are two main models that analyze 
the panel data:
1) random effect regression;
2) fixed effect regression.
The crucial difference between these two 
models is in unobserved firms’ effect (it in-
cludes factors that correlate with the regres-
sors). The fixed effect model supposes that 
there can be a connection, but the random 
effect model assumes that unobserved ef-
fects do not have such relationships with 
other variables and that they only influence 
residuals.
The basic Ohlson model is estimated with 
random and fixed effect models, and then the 
one best suited for estimating the probability 
of financial distress is chosen. After that, 
industry and market variables are included 
one by one in this chosen model. However, 
before the panel data analysis, it is neces-
sary to run a pooled regression. The pooled 
regression perceives the sample not as panel 
data but as a cross-section, i. e., it does not 
take the individual characteristic of an en-
tity that changes over a period of time into 
account.
The outcomes of the three regressions 
are given in Table 8.
Table 8
initial nine variables: pooled, fixed effect and random effect regressions results
variable
model
pooled fixed effect random effect
Size –0.4***
(–3.46)
0.19
(0.42)
–0.49**
(–2.17)
Leverage 0.77
(1.33)
0.06
(0.18)
0.1
(0.94)
Ldummy –0.32
(–0.92)
2.49**
(2.17)
0.42
(0.68)
Ocftl –0.23**
(–2.51)
–1.35*
(–1.68)
–0.34**
(–2.53)
Clca 4.14**
(2.49)
2.41
(0.44)
5.83*
(1.83)
ROA –37.03***
(–10.23)
–55.23***
(–5.44)
–58.35***
(–7.57)
Wcta 0.11
(0.11)
–3.78
(–1.13)
–0.61
(–0.33)
Nigrowth –0.14
(–0.58)
–0.1
(–0.26)
–0.6
(–0.18)
Nn 0.74**
(2.22)
–0.19
(–0.29)
0.55
(1.04)
Constant 0.21
(0.14)
–0.73
(–0.25)
Observations 3326 528 3326
Pseudo R2 0.549
LR chi2(9) 724.04 212.73
Wald chi2(9) 88.06
Prob > chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
N o t e: Z-statistics based on standard errors are in parentheses;
*, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
51Evaluation of Financial Distress Costs of Innovative Companies
RMJ 16 (1): 37–62 (2018)
All three models are significant as the 
chi-square is lower than 0.05; the hypoth-
esis that their coefficients are equal to 0 
was rejected. In the pooled regression, the 
coefficients behind Size, operating cash flow 
scaled by total debt (Ocftl), current ratio 
(Clca), return on assets (ROA), dummy for 
net income (Nn) were significant at 5%, 
Leverage at 20%. The rest of coefficients 
were not significant even at a 30% level. 
This model yields more significant coeffi-
cients than the other two.
The random effect model shows almost 
the same meaningful coefficients, except 
the dummy variable for net income, which 
nevertheless has the same positive influence. 
Ldummy and Wcta change their signs, but 
remain insignificant.
While running the fixed effect model, 
the number of observations and groups was 
dropped by the system, obviously because of 
unbalanced sample. The model shows two 
significant factors, i. e. the Ldummy and 
ROA at a 5% significance level. Besides, 
Ocftl is significant at a 10% level.
Overall, it was unexpected that the other 
factors would yield insignificant results, but 
in order to overcome this, we decided to 
adjust the models with dummies for years. 
The results are presented in Table 9.
Although all three models are significant 
at a 1% level, the situation did not change 
noticeably. The dummies for years yielded 
significant results in 2012, 2014, and 2015. 
Year of 2012 can be explained by the results 
of the global financial crisis. Most interest-
ing are 2014 and 2015 as they show that the 
financial results for the previous two years 
had a positive influence on the probability of 
financial distress. Models demonstrate that 
the coefficients behind Size, Ocftl, ROA, 
2014, and 2015 are significant. That means 
that the more assets a firm has, the lower is 
the probability of financial distress. Return 
on assets and Operating cash flows scaled by 
total debt have the same sign and influence 
the dependent variable adversely.
The pooled regression pseudo R-squared 
increased slightly, from 54.9% to 56.23%, 
and Leverage became significant at a 10% 
level. Fixed effect models show the causes 
of variation within a company, and as men-
tioned above, some companies were founded 
during the observation period, which reduces 
the size of the sample. This is perhaps why 
the coefficients do not demonstrate signifi-
cant values. The random effect model also 
did not change, except in that Net income 
growth sign varies, but its coefficient yields 
an insignificant result.
Thus, it is necessary to determine which 
model is better than the other two. To start 
with, the fixed effect model should be com-
pared with the random effect model and with 
the pooled regression. It seems appropriate 
to use the Hausman test for this purpose. 
The null hypothesis suggests the random 
effect model, and if the null hypothesis is 
rejected, then the fixed effect model will be 
preferred as it is better suited. An estima-
tion of the fixed effect model vs. the random 
effect model is presented in Table 10. The 
Hausman test did not yield any statistical 
result, as chi square is equal to –97.46, 
which is less than 0.
The next pair that should be compared is 
the fixed effect model vs. the pooled regres-
sion. It is also evaluated with the Hausman 
test. The outcome is presented in Table 11. 
As a consequence of the Hausman test, the 
pooled regression is more appropriate than 
fixed effect model. The p-value is much 
higher than 0.05, so the null hypothesis, 
that the pooled model is preferred, was not 
rejected. Notably, both pairs of tests, the 
fixed/random and fixed/pooled, showed that 
the fixed effect model is worse. This is prob-
ably due to the unbalanced sample.
The last pair that should be examined is 
the random effect model and pooled regres-
sion. When estimating the random effect 
model, we run a test, whether the fraction 
of dependent variable’s variance due to er-
ror between entities is significant or not. 
This fraction is called rho. So, if it is not 
equal to 0, then the random effect model is 
preferred over the pooled regression. In this 
study, it can be concluded that the random 
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Table 9
initial nine variables: corrected pooled, fixed effect and random effect regression results
variable
model
pooled fixed effect random effect
Size –0.47***
(–3.94)
–0.43
(–0.75)
–0.77***
(–2.94)
Leverage 0.1*
(1.89)
0.06
(0.28)
0.17
(1.53)
Ldummy –0.19
(–0.52)
3.28**
(2.44)
0.76
(1.10)
Ocftl –0.22**
(–2.54)
–1.43*
(–1.70)
–0.34***
(–2.57)
Clca 4.25**
(2.54)
2.7
(0.44)
6.62*
(1.93)
ROA –39.41***
(–10.23)
–61.53***
(–5.18)
–64.15***
(–7.2)
Wcta 0.22
(0.22)
–3.49
(–0.93)
–0.13
(–0.06)
Nigrowth –0.14
(–0.57)
–0.11
(–0.23)
0.12
(–0.33)
Nn 0.55
(1.52)
–0.68
(–0.88)
0.21
(0.34)
2008 –0.21
(–0.35)
0.01
(0.01)
–0.52
(–0.59)
2009 0.74
(1.29)
1.99*
(1.84)
1.33
(1.56)
2010 0.83
(1.26)
1.95*
(1.72)
1.51
(1.57)
2011 0.5
(0.81)
1.53
(1.28)
1.13
(1.20)
2012 1.09*
(1.91)
2.05*
(1.89)
1.61*
(1.85)
2013 0.49
(0.78)
1.05
(0.9)
0.72
(0.77)
2014 1.3**
(2.14)
2.32*
(1.95)
2.09**
(2.24)
2015 1.17**
(1.99)
1.78
(1.56)
1.82**
(2.02)
Constant 0.3
(0.02)
0.08
(0.02)
Observations 3326 528 3326
Pseudo R2 0.5623
LR chi2(9) 741.49 225.40
Wald chi2(9) 73.71
Prob > chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
N o t e: Z-statistics based on standard errors are in parentheses;
*, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
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Table 10
fixed effect vs. random effect models, Hausman test
variable Difference between random and fixed effect models
Size 0.34
Leverage –0.1
Ldummy 2.5
Ocftl –1.09
Clca –3.92
ROA 2.62
Wcta –3.37
Nigrowth 0.1
Nn –0.88
2008 0.53
2009 0.66
2010 0.45
2011 0.4
2012 0.45
2013 0.33
2014 0.23
2015 –0.4
Chi2(17) = –97.46 < 0
Table 11
fixed effect model vs. pooled regression, Hausman test
variable Difference between random and fixed effect models
Size 0.04
Leverage –0.04
Ldummy 3.46
Ocftl –1.2
Clca –1.58
ROA –22.11
Wcta –3.72
Nigrowth 0.03
Nn –1.23
2008 0.22
2009 1.25
2010 1.12
2011 1.03
2012 0.96
2013 0.56
2014 1.02
2015 0.62
Chi2(17) = 16.64
Prob > chi2 = 0.4788
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effect model is better than pooled regres-
sion, as the hypothesis of rho equal to 0 was 
rejected at a 1% significance level.
Therefore, if the pooled regression is 
better than the fixed model, and random 
is better than pooled, it can be concluded 
that the random effect model is the best. 
However, it seems unforeseeable that some 
variables have insignificant coefficients with 
a p-value higher than 0.1, for example, le-
verage should logically have an influence. 
Perhaps it occurs due to the heteroscedastic-
ity of the sample. That is why the random 
effect model is adjusted and standard errors 
are clustered at the firm level to deal with 
potential heteroscedasticity. The results of 
the regression checked for robustness are 
presented in Table 12.
The outcome of the random effect logit 
regression checked for robustness showed 
that Size, Ocftl, Clca and ROA are signifi-
cant. Leverage shows positive impact on the 
probability of distress at 10% significance 
level.
The economic interpretation for the size 
of a company is the same as for the initial 
random effect model, i. e., the larger the 
company, the lower is the probability of 
bankruptcy. Leverage and the Ocftl ratios 
are based on the total debt level and show 
that the higher debt is, the more likely is 
insolvency. However, in Leverage debt is 
the numerator, so the impact of the debt to 
market capitalization ratio is positive, and 
Operating cash flows to total debt influences 
the dependent variable in a negative man-
ner. The current liability to current assets 
ratio (Clca) has positive relationship with 
the probability of bankruptcy. Return on 
assets influences the likelihood of insolvency 
negatively as the higher net income is, the 
higher is the interest coverage ratio. Thus, 
the dummy for interest coverage yields 0 
value.
It should be mentioned that the dummy 
variables for the years also yield significant 
results in 2009, 2012, 2014, and 2015.
The next step of the research supposes 
adding market variables to the chosen model. 
Table 12
random effect model with a robustness check
variable coefficients
Size –0.77***
(–3.29)
Leverage 0.17*
(1.72)
Ldummy 0.76
(1.06)
Ocftl –0.34**
(–2.35)
Clca 6.62**
(2.16)
ROA –64.15***
(–6.00)
Wcta –0.13
(–0.06)
Nigrowth –0.12
(–0.30)
Nn 0.21
(0.31)
2008 –0.52
(–0.81)
2009 1.33*
(1.93)
2010 1.51
(1.62)
2011 1.13
(1.42)
2012 1.61**
(2.21)
2013 0.72
(0.85)
2014 2.09***
(3.08)
2015 1.82**
(2.49)
Constant 0.08
(0.03)
Observations 3326
Wald chi2(17) 73.71
Prob > chi2 0.0000
N o t e: Z-statistics based on standard errors are 
in parentheses;
*, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at 
the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
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These include stock return volatility and the 
total assets book to market value ratio. The 
results are presented in Table 13.
The new added variables show significant 
results, i. e., Bm at a 5% significance level 
and Vol at 10%. It is also noticeable that 
other significant factors’ p-value changed 
only slightly, i. e., it rose for Size and Clca. 
On the contrary, it fell for Leverage and 
Ocftl. Overall, at a 10% level the market 
variables are significant, and there are sev-
en significant coefficients: Size, Leverage, 
Ocftl, Clca, ROA, Vol, and Bm.
The next part of the investigation is fo-
cused on the industry indicators, i. e., the 
four R&D ratios. They are separately added 
to the model. The results are compiled in 
Table 14.
Three of the R&D indicators demonstrat-
ed a positive influence on the probability 
of financial distress, i. e., R&D to assets, 
R&D to sales, and R&D to the number of 
employees. However, only the last two yield 
significant results. Model 4 highlighted the 
meaningful negative coefficient behind the 
innovative sector index. It can be explained 
by the fact that this factor includes R&D 
expenses for the previous four years, and the 
logic is the following: if a firm invests in 
innovative project(s) for such a long period 
of time, then it (they) must be profitable. 
Intuitively, this is why the sign is negative.
Size has a significant influence only in 
Model 4 and it has negative impact. Lever­
age, Ocftl, ROA, and Vol also de mon strated 
significant results in each model, unlike 
Ldummy, Wcta, Nigrowth, and Nn. Clca 
variable is insignificant in Models 1 and 3, 
but in Models 2 and 4 it demonstrates a 
positive influence upon the probability of 
insolvency. There is a negative relationship 
between Bm and the dependent variable in 
Models 1 and 4.
Thus, there are four models with R&D 
indicators. However, even if Model 1 will 
not be taken into account given that its 
coefficient is insignificant, the model that 
operates best and predicts the probability 
of bankruptcy most accurately should be 
Table 13
model with market variables
variable coefficients
Size –0.47*
(–1.74)
Leverage 0.17**
(2.02)
Ldummy 0.9
(1.26)
Ocftl –0.34**
(–2.44)
Clca 4.9*
(1.60)
ROA –61***
(–5.77)
Wcta –0.7
(–0.35)
Nigrowth –0.14
(–0.33)
Nn –0.04
(0.06)
Vol 4.1*
(1.82)
Bm –2.54**
(–2.06)
2008 –0.59
(–0.74)
2009 0.74
(0.92)
2010 1.74*
(1.92)
2011 1.39*
(1.61)
2012 1.63**
(2.21)
2013 0.74
(0.84)
2014 2.35***
(3.26)
2015 1.86**
(2.47)
Constant –1.8
(–0.68)
Observations 3326
Wald chi2(17) 82.53
Prob > chi2 0.0000
N o t e: Z-statistics based on standard errors are 
in parentheses;
*, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at 
the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
56 E. Y. Makeeva, M. O. Khugaeva
RMJ 16 (1): 37–62 (2018)
chosen. In this case, a receiver operating 
characteristics (ROC) curve is constructed 
and the area under this curve is cal culated. 
The results are presented in Table 15.
Table 14
four models with r&D indicators
variable
coefficients
model 1 model 2 model 3 model 4
Size –0.378
(–1.36)
–0.208
(–0.75)
–0.407
(–1.54)
–0.744**
(–2.30)
Leverage 0.173**
(2.01)
0.173*
(1.91)
0.156*
(1.70)
0.177**
(2.00)
Ldummy 0.923
(1.26)
1.12
(1.43)
0.975
(1.32)
0.781
(1.13)
Ocftl –0.351**
(–2.43)
–0.38**
(–2.59)
–0.359**
(–2.53)
–0.341**
(–2.46)
Clca 4.68
(1.53)
5.744*
(1.79)
4.592
(1.53)
5.233*
(1.73)
ROA –60.41***
(–5.56)
–59***
(–5.39)
–60.048***
(–5.58)
–64.003***
(–5.51)
Wcta –0.824
(–0.41)
0.199
(0.10)
–0.513
(–0.25)
–0.554
(–0.29)
Nigrowth –0.144
(–0.35)
–0.191
(–0.45)
–0.143
(–0.35)
–0.14
(–34)
Nn –0.066
(–0.10)
–0.133
(–0.20)
–0.109
(–0.16)
0.286
(0.43)
Vol 4.183*
(1.84)
4.777**
(2.03)
4.314*
(1.87)
4.11*
(1.87)
Bm –2.34*
(–1.84)
–1.523
(–1.14)
–2.009
(–1.55)
–2.678**
(–2.15)
Rda 5.14
(0.76)
Rds 12.553**
(2.54)
Rde 11.756*
(1.78)
Rdcta –5.543**
(–2.06)
Observations 3326 3326 3326 3326
Wald chi2 76.33 56.57 72.43 81.90
Prob > chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
N o t e: Z-statistics based on standard errors are in parentheses;
*, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
Table 15
roc curve estimates
model model 1 model 2 model 3 model 4
Area under LROC 0.9399 0.9365 0.9370 0.9452
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Thus, it can be concluded that Model 4 
is the best one. It predicts insolvency with 
a probability of 94.52%. The final equation 
(Model 4) has the following form (16) 
y Size Leverage
L Oc
i t i t i t
i t
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,
. . .
. .
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+ ⋅ − ⋅
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The outcome is presented in Table 16.
After that, the probability of distress is 
calculated in Stata 13.0 as a post estima-
tion. Next, in order to obtain the absolute 
value of direct distress costs, this value 
is multiplied by sales. Relative values are 
also evaluated as the direct distress costs 
scaled by total assets and by value of a com-
pany. The overall results are presented in 
Table 17.
Evaluation of indirect costs
An ordinary least squares regression of a 
company’s sales on the aggregate sales of 
the industry for the ten prior years was 
conducted. The outcome of the model yields 
a significant result for the independent vari-
able at a 1% level. Thus, the following equa-
tion is provided:
Sales
Aggregate industry sales
2015
2005
4867 269 0 0005264= + ×
× −
. .
2014 + ε.
 (17)
In order to find estimated sales for each 
company, the amount of aggregate industry 
sales for 2005–2014 is substituted in every 
of 389 cases.
Furthermore, the mean profit margin for 
the ten years from 2006 to 2015 is calculat-
ed, and this figure is multiplied by estimated 
sales of the firms. Such manipulations give 
Table 16
insolvency prediction with model 4
variable coefficients
Size –0.74**
(–2.30)
Leverage 0.18**
(2.00)
Ldummy 0.78
(1.13)
Ocftl –0.34**
(–2.46)
Clca 5.23*
(1.73)
ROA –64***
(–5.51)
Wcta –0.55
(–0.29)
Nigrowth –0.14
(–0.34)
Nn 0.29
(0.43)
Vol 4.11*
(1.87)
Bm –2.68**
(–2.15)
Rdcta –5.54**
(–2.06)
Constant 0.28
Observations 3326
Wald chi2 81.90
Prob > chi2 0.0000
N o t e: Z-statistics based on standard errors are 
in parentheses;
*, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at 
the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
Table 17
Direct distress costs
variable mean value
Direct distress costs $313.88 mln
Direct distress costs/Total assets 2.6%
Direct distress costs/Value of company 4.18%
58 E. Y. Makeeva, M. O. Khugaeva
RMJ 16 (1): 37–62 (2018)
one the opportunity to appraise evaluated 
profit.
The last step of evaluation of indirect 
distress costs is take the difference between 
evaluated net income and real net income. 
Thus, the indirect financial costs’ mean value 
is equal to $339.84 million in 2015. Average 
relative values are also calculated, the in-
direct distress costs scaled by total assets 
and the value of company amount 5.35% 
and 7.6%, respectively (Table 18).
It is interesting that 34% of the firms 
have positive distress costs, i. e., unexpected 
profits. The sample includes gigantic hold-
ings, which are developing much more rap-
idly than their parent industries, so their 
financial indicators tend predominate those 
of other holdings.
Thus, both the direct and indirect costs 
of financial distress are evaluated, and to 
complete the investigation, the total distress 
costs are estimated as the sum of direct and 
indirect distress costs. The results are given 
in Table 19.
The absolute mean value of total distress 
costs is approximately $660 million. The 
relative figures show that these costs are 
equal to 7.95% of total assets, or 11.78% 
of firms’ value. The ratios are quite high 
and should be taken into account when mak-
ing financial decisions such as the choice of 
target capital structure.
conclusion
We set the goal of evaluating financial dis-
tress costs of innovative companies at the 
beginning of this paper. This was achieved 
by completing the aforementioned tasks.
To sum up, in Table 20 we compiled in-
formation about forecasts and outcomes.
The conducted research gives one an op-
portunity to conclude that the higher the 
debt, the higher are the interest expenses 
that negatively influence the interest coverage 
ratio. As the dependent variable is a dummy 
variable y equal to 1 if interest coverage is 
less than 1 and 0 if otherwise, then higher 
debt leads to y = 1. The influence of current 
liabilities to current assets and cash flow from 
operating activity to total debt has the same 
logic as the influence of leverage, so the sign 
of this variable should be positive.
Variables that include net income have an 
impact on EBITDA, which is the numerator 
of the interest coverage ratio. The dummy 
for net income, if it was negative over the 
last two years is equal to 1 and 0 if otherwise. 
It should have a positive impact as if it is 
equal to 1, then interest coverage is lower 
than 0, and the dependent dummy is equal 
to 1. Therefore, the return on assets and 
changes in net income also has a positive 
effect on the interest coverage ratio, but a 
negative impact on the dependent dummy.
Table 18
indirect distress costs
variable mean value
Indirect distress costs $339.84 mln
Indirect distress costs/Total assets 5.35%
Indirect distress costs/Value of company 7.6%
Table 19
total distress costs
variable mean value
Total distress costs $658.72 mln 
Total distress costs/Total assets 7.95%
Total distress costs/Value of company 11.78%
59Evaluation of Financial Distress Costs of Innovative Companies
RMJ 16 (1): 37–62 (2018)
The size of company is presented by a 
natural logarithm of total assets. Logically, 
the larger the company is, the lower is the 
likelihood of bankruptcy. Working capi-
tal scaled by total assets is expected to be 
negative, as the numerator of the ratio is 
estimated as current assets minus current 
liabilities. Thus, the higher the working 
capital, the lower are the interest expenses, 
and the higher is the interest coverage ratio, 
so the dummy is not equal to 1.
According to [Zhang, 2015] such market 
characteristic of a firm as book to market 
value and stock return volatility has a posi-
tive impact upon the probability of distress. 
This can be explained the following way: if 
debt rises, then book to market value be-
comes lower. At the same time, interest ex-
penses go up and the interest coverage ratio 
fall, and if it is less than 1, the dependent 
dummy variable is equal to 1, which explains 
the negative relationship.
R&D expenses have significant impact 
upon the probability of bankruptcy, and 
consequently, upon financial distress. Un-
expectedly, R&D indexes have different 
kinds of effects. R&D scaled by total as-
sets, sales, and the number of employees 
depend on the financial results of one year. 
The influence of these variables is positive. 
However, research and development capital 
scaled by total assets demonstrated an ad-
verse impact on the probability of distress, 
while the forecast was positive. The logic 
here is that R&D capital includes the sum 
of investments in innovative projects over 
the last four years. Over such a long period 
time, these projects begin to make a profit, 
so firm’s EBITDA rises and boosts the inter-
est coverage ratio. It should be mentioned 
that the rest of the R&D indexes demon-
strate a positive relationship, but they do 
not include prior periods’ expenses upon 
such projects.
A strong positive relationship was found 
with the financial results of the previous two 
years. Intuitively, it is clear that if a firm 
was not in distress over the last two years, 
it will not be in a state of distress this year, 
and vice versa. Besides, the results of post 
crisis periods demonstrate a positive impact 
upon the probability of financial distress. 
Table 20
results of hypotheses testing
Hypothesis (variable) Expected sign Estimated sign
H1 (Leverage) + +
H2 (Clca) + +
H3 (Nn) + Insignificant
H4 (Size) – –
H5 (Wcta) – Insignificant
H6 (ROA) – –
H7 (Ocftl) – –
H8 (Nigrowth) – Insignificant
H9 (Bm) + –
H10 (Vol) + +
H11 (Rda) + +
H11 (Rds) + +
H11 (Rde) + +
H11 (Rdcta) + –
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Although most companies from the sample 
are from the US, they operate in many other 
countries, where crisis inflicted economic 
damage not in 2007, but at a later date.
Some firms showed unexpected profits, 
i. e., their indirect distress costs became 
“benefits”. However, considering the fact 
that the sample includes massive holdings 
that invest a great deal of money and as-
sets in innovations and act as leaders on 
the market, such a result was predictable.
Overall, the total financial distress costs 
in absolute and relative terms show that 
they cannot be ignored when making finan-
cial decisions, especially at those companies 
investing in research and development proj-
ects. The present paper proposes two models: 
those for evaluation of direct and indirect 
costs in the innovative companies. In future 
research, these models can be expanded with 
new variables in order to obtain more ac-
curate results.
The following recommendations are sug-
gested for future research:
1. It is necessary to determine the influ-
ence of other sets of determinants on 
the probability of financial distress.
2. Unexpected financial distress costs also 
should be checked for effects arising from 
other factors.
3. Another index that characterizes the in-
novative firms should be developed.
4. The present sample includes large holdings. 
We recommend that small and medium 
firms should be analyzed in the future.
5. Furthermore, we suggest comparing fi-
nancial distress costs and tax benefits 
in order to find some trade-off values 
between these variables, and therefore 
determine the target value of companies.
The current paper could be useful for com-
panies that must make a decision concerning 
investments in research and development 
projects. It is also helpful for the govern-
ment, especially the tax authorities, which 
might regulate innovative companies through 
tax breaks. Finally, researchers can use this 
paper as a basis for further investigation.
Appendix
vIF Data
variable vIF 1/vIF variable vIF 1/vIF
Wcta 4.90 0.203924 Size 1.94 0.516148
Clca 4.20 0.238017 ROA 1.91 0.523995
Rda 4.11 0.243115 Bm 1.69 0.591086
Rde 2.62 0.381736 Nn 1.43 0.699973
Rdcta 2.61 0.383143 Vol 1.27 0.789283
Rds 2.48 0.403303 Nigrowth 1.26 0.796759
Leverage 2.39 0.417625 Ocftl 1.04 0.961825
Tdta 2.37 0.422535 Mean VIF 2.41
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В течение последних десятилетий инвестиции в НИОКР существенно возросли. Многие иссле-
дователи подтверждают положительную связь между расходами на НИОКР и стоимостью ком-
пании. Однако инвестиции в инновации характеризуются высокой степенью неопределенности. 
Кроме того, инновационные проекты начинают приносить доходы, как правило, в долгосрочном 
периоде. Эти факторы значительно увеличивают вероятность финансовой неустойчивости ком-
пании. Поэтому целью данной работы является оценка издержек финансовой неустойчивости в 
фирмах, которые инвестируют в НИОКР. В работе проводится анализ финансово-экономических 
показателей 389 инновационных компаний c 2006 по 2015 г. Анализ осно ван на оценке прямых 
и косвенных издержек финансовой неустойчивости фирм. Прямые издержки оцениваются с по-
мощью использования панельной логистической регрессии, а косвенные — как упущенная при-
быль или непредвиденный доход в сравнении с отраслевыми показателями. В результате анализа 
подтверждается связь между расходами на НИОКР и финансовой неустойчивостью компаний. 
Анализ показывает, что издержки финансовой неустойчивости инновационных фирм составляют 
7,95% от величины общих активов, или в среднем 11,78% стоимости компании.
Ключевые слова: издержки финансовой неустойчивости, банкротство, инновационные ком-
пании, панельная логистическая регрессия.
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